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The Insane Logistics of Peacekeeping in Gaza

Peacekeeping is really Logistics 101

So the UN just approved President Trump’s Gaza peace plan.

That sentence alone is going to melt a few brains on social media, but let’s park the politics for a second and talk about what this actually means in the real world.

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Because if this thing moves forward, we’re about to see something the world hasn’t seriously tried in decades:
a large, multinational peacekeeping force deployed into one of the most densely populated, politically radioactive pieces of real estate on the planet.

And the first question that landed in my inbox was not:
“Is this fair to Israel?”
Or:
“Is this fair to the Palestinians?”

It was:
“Ryan… who is actually going to show up with boots on the ground?”

Good question.

I wrote a whole white paper on this for a private client, which paid subscribers can read below it’s got tables, and UN data, and is the unclassified, readable version.

So let’s talk about who goes, how they get there, and what it means for Gaza.

Why This Is, Surprisingly, Good News

Let’s get this out of the way:
Yes, this is good news.

It’s good news for Israel because it means someone else may share the burden of securing Gaza after the war. It’s good news for Palestinians because a multinational force, done right, can act as a buffer, a stabilizer, and a bridge to a political process that might actually lead to statehood instead of another 10-year cycle of rockets and rubble.

But that also means the hard part just started.
The UN didn’t just approve a “plan.”

They basically approved a logistical moonshot.

You might think peacekeeping is done by NATO, or “the West,” or whatever term people are using on cable news this week.

Nope.

According to recent UN figures, the top troop contributors are countries that don’t usually make American headlines:

  • Nepal

  • Rwanda

  • Bangladesh

  • India

  • Indonesia

  • Plus Pakistan, Ghana, China, Morocco, Ethiopia rounding out the list

These countries are the UN’s workhorses. They send battalions, medical units, engineers, and police, and they do it over and over again. They’ve built an entire career pipeline around peacekeeping.

Now enter the wildcard: Indonesia.

Indonesia’s president went to the UN and said, essentially:

“We are ready to deploy 20,000 or even more to Gaza.”

That is nearly ten times their entire current UN footprint.
You don’t make that offer unless you intend to become the backbone of the mission.

Politically, it makes sense:

  • Muslim-majority country

  • Professional army

  • Wants a bigger global role

  • Peacekeeping = prestige + money

If I were a Palestinian civilian, I’d probably feel a lot better seeing an Indonesian or Bangladeshi soldier at a checkpoint than an occupying force that’s been bombing my neighborhood for years. Culture, language, and religion matter in stabilization.

The Regional Heavyweights: Egypt and Jordan

Then there are the two neighbors you can’t ignore: Egypt and Jordan.

They’re not top-tier peacekeeping contributors in raw numbers, but they are strategically critical:

  • Gaza’s border with Egypt

  • The West Bank and regional politics with Jordan

Both are explicitly referenced in Trump’s plan as consultation partners. Even if they don’t send large infantry units into Gaza City, expect them to:

  • Host staging bases

  • Provide border and police units

  • Offer senior officers to the mission HQ

  • Act as political and regional guarantors

Then there are the “maybes”:

  • Turkey – big army, big politics, unpredictable.

  • Azerbaijan – closely tied to Turkey, might join to earn political goodwill.

  • UAE / Italy – previously consulted under earlier proposals, might provide naval/air/logistics support.

And, hovering in the background:

  • China – likely to send small, symbolic contingents: engineers, medical units, construction. They’ll want the photo op, not the casualty list.

Why Poor Countries Love Peacekeeping

Here’s the part nobody talks about on TV:
Peacekeeping is a business model.

To join a mission, a country goes through three levels of readiness:

Level 1 – Prep

You train troops to UN standards. This isn’t “boot camp.”
These are mid-career soldiers getting professional courses in:

  • Human rights and civilian protection

  • IED awareness

  • Cordon-and-search

  • Checkpoint operations

  • Patrolling in hostile, civilian-heavy environments

You also gather equipment, certify medics, legal advisers, and logistics capability.

Level 2 – Verification

The UN sends people to check that:

  • The troops exist

  • The equipment exists

  • It actually works

  • You have enough tents, generators, water systems, trucks, PPE, and medical gear

You’d be shocked how many times a country promises “300 trucks” and shows up with eleven and a donkey.

Level 3 – Deployment-Ready

Once verified, the UN signs a Memorandum of Understanding with that country.

This is where the money comes in.

The UN reimburses roughly $1,428 per soldier per month.

Now imagine you’re Nepal, Rwanda, or Bangladesh. That amount is several times what many soldiers earn back home. And here’s the kicker:

The soldier doesn’t see most of that money.
The government does.

So if Indonesia sends 20,000 troops to Gaza, that’s tens of millions of dollars per month flowing back to Jakarta.

Peacekeeping becomes:

  • Foreign policy

  • Force development

  • Revenue stream

Which is exactly why countries sprint toward missions like this.

Moving 20,000 Peacekeepers into Gaza Isn’t “Put Them on a Plane”

OK, so let’s say the political deals are done.
Whoever’s going has been selected.

Now you have to move those forces into Gaza.

This is where the nerd stuff starts.

Step 1: Get to the Region

Personnel usually fly.
Heavy gear usually sails.

For Gaza, equipment would funnel through:

  • Egypt’s Port Said, or

  • Israel’s Port of Ashdod, or

  • Possibly a staging hub in Jordan

Sealift is more likely for big stuff: armored vehicles, generators, fuel bladders, field hospitals.

Smaller countries often rely on bigger partners. The U.S., for example, has historically moved Nepali vehicles to South Sudan because Nepal simply didn’t have the strategic sealift to do it.

So imagine:

  • Indonesian infantry

  • Bangladeshi engineers

  • Rwandan military police

  • Indian logistics units

All converging on the eastern Mediterranean, with American, European, or Gulf-state ships quietly doing a lot of the heavy lifting behind the scenes.

Step 2: Staging Areas

Nobody drives straight off a ship and into Gaza City to start directing traffic.

Units first sit in staging areas, while the UN and host nations:

  • Build semi-permanent camps

  • Install water purification systems

  • Set up fuel delivery

  • Activate medical facilities

  • Establish communications and command posts

This takes weeks.

The most likely staging areas?

  • The Sinai Peninsula in Egypt

  • Possibly parts of Jordan

  • Maybe, in a very politically managed way, some territory near Ashdod in Israel, but space is limited and politics are complex

Step 3: Convoy Into Gaza

Once camps and logistics hubs are ready, units convoy into the Gaza Area of Operations.

A convoy isn’t a line of trucks and good vibes.

You need:

  • Route clearance

  • Engineering support

  • Escort vehicles

  • Recovery vehicles for breakdowns

  • Medical evacuation plans

  • Real-time coordination with Israeli forces

  • Deconfliction with local security actors and whatever remains of Hamas or other armed groups

Every kilometer is a mix of diplomacy, logistics, and “try not to get shot at.”

Sustaining the Mission: Where Most Operations Fail

Deploying is the easy part.
Staying is hard.

Once the peacekeepers are in Gaza, they need:

  • Fuel

  • Food

  • Water treatment

  • Power generation

  • Ammunition

  • Vehicle maintenance

  • Medical care

  • Camp defense

The UN provides:

  • Mission-wide communications

  • Some engineering assets

  • Base infrastructure

  • Bulk water sources

  • Medical support at certain echelons

But the countries are responsible for:

  • Their own internal communications

  • Generators and power

  • Food preparation

  • First-six-month tentage and shelters

  • Recovery and counter-IED teams

  • All contingent-owned equipment

So if Indonesia sends 20,000 soldiers, they’re essentially building a mini-Indonesia inside Gaza for those troops:

  • 20,000 beds

  • 20,000 uniforms and boots

  • Thousands of meals per day

  • Massive fuel storage and distribution

  • Workshops and spare parts for vehicles

  • Water purification systems

  • Mobile hospitals and clinics

  • Laundry, waste management, and sanitation

Commanders will tell you:

“Peacekeepers eat logistics for breakfast.”

They’re not joking.

Who Will Actually Go to Gaza? My Analyst Take

Now that we’ve gone through the why and the how, let’s talk who.

1. Indonesia – Very Likely

  • Publicly offered 20,000 troops

  • Muslim-majority, politically acceptable on the ground

  • Big opportunity for prestige and influence

  • Massive reimbursement potential

2. India – Likely

  • One of the UN’s most experienced troop contributors

  • Huge logistics capability

  • Already runs large contingents in UNIFIL (Lebanon), which is geographically and politically similar in some ways

  • “Largest democracy in the world” plays well diplomatically

3. Bangladesh, Nepal, Rwanda – Likely

These are professional peacekeeping machines.
Their officers know UN procedures better than some Western militaries. They understand how to live out of tents in bad places and not completely fall apart.

4. Jordan & Egypt – Highly Likely

Not because they’ll send the most infantry, but because:

  • Everything moves through them

  • They can host staging bases

  • They can provide border units and police mentors

  • They’re explicitly consulted in Trump’s plan

5. Ghana, Morocco, Ethiopia – Possible

All have deep peacekeeping experience and established training centers.

6. China – Symbolic But Possible

Expect:

  • Engineers

  • Medics

  • Construction units

They’ll want enough presence to say “we were there,” but not enough to get stuck in a messy firefight on CNN.

7. NATO States – Unlikely in Big Numbers

  • U.S., UK, Canada: political cost is too high.

  • Maybe a few staff officers, trainers, or niche units.

  • France / Italy might contribute small contingents or naval/logistics support, especially given Mediterranean interests.

  • UAE could quietly support sealift, airlift, or base access.

What the UN Just Approved

This is not:

  • “Send in 10 countries and high-five each other on the tarmac.”

This is:

  • Strategic airlift

  • Naval sealift

  • Camp construction at scale

  • A multinational command system

  • Coordination with Israel, Egypt, Jordan, the Palestinian Authority, and the UN

  • Counter-IED and route clearance

  • Engineers rebuilding power and water plants

  • Civil affairs teams mediating between civilians, local leaders, and armed actors

  • Millions of gallons of fuel per month

  • Thousands of tons of food, medicine, and equipment

And all of that is before you get to the core mission:
stabilizing Gaza, preventing a security collapse, and giving political negotiations a chance to work.

It’s ambitious.
It’s risky.
It’s expensive.

But it’s not impossible.
We’ve done versions of this before in places like Lebanon, South Sudan, and the Balkans. Just… never in a place quite like Gaza, at this level of global scrutiny, with this level of trauma on all sides.

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