After interviewing over fifty Israeli soldiers, I’ve compiled a full After Action Review of Israel’s post–October 7th wars in Gaza and Lebanon.
This three-part series breaks down what went right, what went wrong, and what can be improved—not just for Israel, but for every Western military that may face similar urban, hybrid, and information-warfare challenges.
If you are a free member, the first and second videos in the series can be found below on YouTube. The third will be added when it is released on November 14th. Join now for access to the full video.
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The IDF’s strengths—combined-arms proficiency, adaptability, and exceptional battlefield medicine—were offset by structural weaknesses: overreliance on reservists, poor information-warfare management, and an improvisation culture that too often replaced doctrine.
What went right:
What went wrong:
The whitepaper and briefing slides are available to paid subscribers. If you’re military or defense-adjacent, I can deliver this briefing in person to your unit or organization.
Briefing slides and whitepaper below:
